Spinoza’s argument for a bodily imagination by Pugliese, Nastassja
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
PHILOSOPHY SOUTH
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
18(3):172-176, sep/dec 2017
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2017.183.07
Imagination is chara erized by Spinoza as the first kind of knowledge (E2p40sch)3 and it 
is defined as a way in which the mind regards bodies [contemplandi modum] and their affections 
(E2p17). As such, imagination is a mode of thought. However, a further mapping of the usage of the 
concepts imago-imaginari-imaginamus in the Ethics indicates that imagination is a complex a ivity 
involving various kinds of events such as image-making, hallucinations, dreaming, and construction 
of universals and general notions. Some of these events, such as delirium and visual imagery, arise 
from the constitution of the body and not from the mind. This distinction between a corporeal and 
a mental imagination is explicitly stated in Epistle 17 to Pieter Balling, where Spinoza claims that 
effects of the imagination arise from the constitution of either the body or of mind4. Also, in E1app, 
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ABSTRACT
Imagination is characterized by Spinoza as the first kind of knowledge, and, as such, imagi-
nation is a mode of thought. However, in a further mapping of the concept in the Ethics, we 
see that it is an activity that involves both the mind and the extended body. The standard 
and idealist interpretation of imagination does not account for its corporeal or extended 
dimension, leaving aside an important aspect of the activity. Based on the thesis of causal 
independency of attributes, I will argue against the traditional interpretation and demon-
strate that there is an imagination of the body in Spinoza.
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3 Throughout the paper, when referencing the Ethics, the following citation format is used: E stands for Ethics, 
followed by the part of the book in Arabic numerals, then p for the proposition, followed by its number. The 
citation ends with additional information such as ‘sch’ for scholium, ‘l’ for lemma, ‘post’ for postulate, etc.
4 Spinoza claims, in the controversial Epistle 17 to Pieter Balling, that “the effects of the imagination [ef-
fectus imaginationis] arise from the constitution either of the body or of mind [vel corporis, vel mentis]. […] 
We find by experience that fevers and other corporeal changes are the cause of delirium, and that those 
whose blood is thick [tenacem sanguinem] imagine nothing but quarrels, troubles, murders and things of 
that sort. We also see that the imagination can be determined simply by the constitution of the soul [ab 
animae constitutione determinari], since, as we find, it follows in the wake of the intellect in all things, linking 
together and interconnecting its images and words just as the intellect does its demonstrations, so that 
there is almost nothing we can understand without the imagination instantly forming an image” (Ep 17) 
(Collected Works, Volume I, p. 803). In this letter, Spinoza is explicitly characterizing imagination as having 
both corporeal and mental causes. One could argue that the arguments in the epistle are problematic due 
to its context of enunciation (a reply to a friend on the occasion of his son’s passing) and cannot therefore be 
considered as strong evidence. So, in order to avoid this criticism, I will show how the problem also appears 
in the context of the Ethics if we take traditionally accepted interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics and 
epistemology into account. I will not, therefore, limit my argument to the controversial letter 17.
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imagination is chara erized as the result of an affection of the 
body or a function of the disposition of the brain. 
Although scholars have pointed out that imagination 
has a multifarious meaning5 in Spinoza, no one seems to 
recognize the claim that there is a bodily imagination6. The 
standard interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of imagination 
where imagination is merely understood as a kind of knowl-
edge may lead to the wrong conclusion that imagination is a 
mental event caused by the intera ion of an individual with 
external bodies. This is so because imagination is a kind of 
mental event that occurs due to an affect or the intera ion 
with other bodies. The problem is that given the thesis of 
causal independence of attributes, an external body cannot 
cause the mind to imagine or to perform any other a ivity. 
So, either imagination is an a ivity of the mind that violates 
the causal regime of attributes or we should reconsider the 
interpretation of imagination that ignores the extended share 
of imagination or takes its existence as merely subsidiary in 
the explanation of the nature of imagination. 
By standard interpretation, I understand any interpre-
tation that recognizes that imagination is a mental event 
(since it is the first kind of knowledge) but that fails to rec-
ognize its extended counterpart. It is important to note that 
we will rarely find an interpretation that fails to recognize the 
presence of the attribute of extension as a concomitant ex-
pression of the attribute of thought, given the nature of modes 
as expressions of the attributes of thought and extension. 
An interpretation that denies the presence of extension as 
concomitant to any event in thought would not be a “stan-
dard” interpretation, just an obviously wrong one. My point 
in this paper is that I think Spinoza is making a stronger case 
for a bodily imagination that is not merely a counterpart of 
the mental imagination, but it is a kind of imagination in itself. 
This bodily imagination, following trivially from the nature of 
modes, has a mental counterpart, but, more importantly, it 
has its own causal connections and explanations.
The scope of this paper is, however, more narrow and 
modest. On it, I will argue that the standard interpretation is 
problematic because it fails to explain the extended causes of 
imagination. This is the case because for the standard interpre-
tation to work, it has to presuppose an idealist version of the 
thesis of causal independence of attributes and idealism itself 
prevents an account of extension. So, I will also show that the 
thesis of causal independence of attributes necessitates an ac-
count of the extended causes of imagination by arguing against 
the idealist objection to the bodily imagination. If I show that 
the idealist objection does not hold, then we will have to con-
sider the need to further investigate the extended causes of 
imagination and the nature of the bodily imagination. 
The thesis of causal 
independence of attributes 
and the standard interpretation 
of imagination 
The thesis of causal independence of attributes is the 
metaphysical ground from which every human a ivity is ex-
plained in Spinoza, and with imagination it is not different. 
This thesis of the causal independence of attributes is derived 
from the monism of substance. The general argument show-
ing the relationship between the attributes and their stand 
with re ect to the substance is the following: because the 
substance exists by the necessity of its nature and is deter-
mined to act by itself alone, it is the only being which acts 
with absolute freedom (E1d7). This unique substance is a 
being which is absolutely infinite and consisting of an infin-
ity of attributes, each one expressing an eternal and infinite 
essence (E1d6). But whereas the infinitude of the substance 
is absolute (ens absolute infinitum, E1d6), the infinitude of at-
tributes is such that each attribute is limited to being infinite 
in its own kind (E1d6exp). To say that an attribute is infinite 
in its kind (suo genera infinita, in E1d6exp) means that the at-
tribute causes everything that can be conceived under that 
kind (genus). So, there is no modification in one attribute that 
is caused through another, all modification of a kind belongs 
to the infinite attribute in question. Since each attribute is 
infinite in its own kind and expresses a determined essence 
of the substance, each attribute must be conceived through 
itself (E1p10), which means that one attribute cannot be pro-
duced by or generate an effect in another7. Now, relating this 
5 Garrett (2008), for example, claims that Spinoza’s “use of the term ‘imagination’ is broad enough to include sensation as well as men-
tal imagery and to include modalities of bodily representation that do not represent shape. He goes on to identify imagination as the 
first and lowest of the three kinds of knowledge or cognition [cognitio], with the intellect (constituted by distinct and adequate ideas) 
providing the higher (second and third) kinds of knowledge” (Garrett, 2008, p. 2). Garrett also does not make the distinction that I am 
proposing between an imagination of the body and an imagination of the mind.
6 Although there is no mention of the concept of a bodily imagination in the literature, there are scholars who are rethinking Spinoza’s 
account of imagination. For example, Steenbakkers (2004) claims that imagination is essential to human freedom, because there is 
something from experience that is constituent of the content of an adequate idea, and imagination is firmly rooted in experience (ideas 
of images and ideas of affects). Also, Vinciguerra (2005) defends that all ideas are conceived through a construction coming from ele-
ments of experience. Vinciguerra and Steenbakkers both describe the mechanisms of the affections of the body and how it can have 
an impression and retain traces, but they do not address the problem of the corporeal causes of imagination and do not go as far as 
claiming that there is actually an argument for a bodily imagination in Spinoza.
7 Spinoza is rejecting the scholastic conception of god where god cannot be thought of as corporeal. I take his claim that god is also 
corporeal as one of the metaphysical foundations that motivates this current investigation and as a strong evidence for the existence of 
corporeal causes of imagination.
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argument with the  ecific case of imagination, we have the 
following problem. 
The standard interpretation considers that imagina-
tion is only a mental event. However, this event of imagi-
nation in the mind always depends upon the constitution 
of the body (E5p21) and, in some cases, Spinoza is claiming 
that imagination can be exclusively explained by its corpo-
real causes (E1app, E2p49sch, E17). If imagination can be 
explained by its corporeal causes, then the mental account 
of imagination of the standard interpretation is problem-
atic. This is the case because the constitution of the body 
cannot cause or explain an event in the mind and vice-versa. 
If imagination is chara erized as a two-sided event that is 
expressed in both attributes, then my understanding is that 
we have to separately and independently consider the imag-
ination of the body and the imagination of the mind. This 
is the case because if one attribute is causally independent 
from another and each attribute is self-caused (because 
they are attributes of the single substance and the substance 
is causa-sui), then we cannot know the nature or order of 
causes in one attribute by appealing to another. This follows 
because Spinoza conceives knowledge as knowledge of the 
cause (E1ax4). So, if the modes of each attribute involve the 
concept of their own attribute and not of another (E2p-
6dem), then we should be able to explain imagination ac-
cording to each attribute without involving the concept of 
another. Hence, the standard interpretation of imagination, 
by reducing the event to the mental causes, fails to capture 
the full extent of imagination. The standard interpretation 
of imagination does not account for the extended causes of 
imagination because of the metaphysical presuppositions in 
which it is grounded: an idealist understanding of Spinoza’s 
theory of attributes8. If idealism is true, then extension and 
its causal regime are inaccessible and cannot be known; and, 
consequently, my argument for the existence of a bodily 
imagination fails. So, I will try to show that the idealist view 
is a misinterpretation and that the so-called explanatory gap 
does not chara erize a gap. 
The idealist objection against 
the bodily imagination 
The idealist objection is the following: a demonstration 
of the corporeal causes of imagination in extension should 
begin by any singular body that is experienced, however this 
or that particular body that I experience is perceived by me 
as an idea (imaginative idea) in my mind9. This claim can 
find some support in the conjunction of E2p11 and E2p13: 
the actual being of the human mind is nothing but the idea 
of a singular thing which actually exists (E2p11), and the 
object of that singular idea that exists in actuality is the body 
(E2p13). So, if the mind is the idea of its body, then every 
bodily experience is perceived by the mind as an idea in the 
mind. Hence, since ideas of bodies are modes of thought, 
we can only perceive things in the mind and, consequently, 
through the attribute of thought. Therefore, it is impossi-
ble to offer a demonstration of extended events through the 
laws of extension because our access to extended events is 
through our ideas of these events10. 
This objection is flawed because it is based on a reduc-
tion of the existence of the external object to a single attribute. 
The external object, according to the deductions of the first 
part of the Ethics, is a singular object that is a modification of 
the substance. This means that every object is both a mode of 
extension and a mode of thought. The individual that expe-
riences the object is also a complex singular being that is both 
a mode of thought and a mode of extension. Hence, when 
the individual experiences a singular object, this experience 
occurs in extension and in thought simultaneously. Our ac-
cess to the object then happens through these two modes of 
the attributes: while the mind forms an idea of the object, the 
body acts over and is a ed upon by an object (which can be 
an external object or not). This is the case because the object 
itself, as a mode of substance, is composed of two attributes. 
The idealist objection is then grounded in a reduction of the 
perception of the modifications of the substance to one of its 
8 The standard interpretation of imagination does not account for the extended causes of imagination because of the metaphysical pre-
suppositions on which it is grounded. There are a few characteristics of Spinoza’s text that justify the idealist interpretation. First, Spino-
za’s descriptions of bodily events are fragmentary and scattered through the Ethics, making the imagination of the body a non-obvious 
concept in his system; second, whenever the corporeal causes of imagination are mentioned (such as, for example, in E1app, E2p17, 
E2p18, and in E5p21), Spinoza defers an extended account and appeals to demonstrations of the event as it occurs in thought. This 
appeal to the causes in thought is, in some cases, done to the detriment of an explanation of extended causes. Finally, in characterizing 
imagination, Spinoza oscillates between a language that is descriptive of extension and one that describes operations of the mind. It is 
not immediately clear how these various descriptions connect and relate to each other, and how they work consistently with Spinoza’s 
general metaphysics.
9 This objection was raised by Gueroult in what he calls a set of Cartesian and idealist objections to Spinoza that appear when comparing 
E2p1 and E2p2 (Gueroult, 1997b, p. 40-43).
10 The corollary of this objection is the claim that there is a priority of thought over extension. The most recent defender of this claim is 
Melamed (2013), who considers that thought is not on a par with other attributes and it actually has priority over them. I will not address 
Melamed’s argument here, but it is interesting to note that he tries to make the rejection of idealism compatible with the priority claim. 
I do not think that there is a priority of thought over extension in Spinoza’s metaphysics, but it is undeniable that the whole project of 
the Ethics is to demonstrate how, through an adequate usage of the intellect, we can construct our freedom. However, it is fundamental 
to attend to the fact that an adequate usage of the intellect is one in which the power and place of extension is taken into account. 
Spinoza is not constructing a philosophy of pure reason, but one in which the power of the intellect is directed to knowing the emotions 
and its own union with the whole of nature.
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attributes. But, according to E1d4 and E2a411, an individual 
is able to perceive the modifications of the substance both 
through thought and extension. Spinoza is expressly claiming 
that we feel our own bodies and its modifications by external 
ones. So, any interpretation that excludes extension from the 
picture is not true to Spinoza’s views. It is important to rule 
out this objection because if it is impossible to experience ob-
jects in extension and elaborate on these objects through the 
ideas that we form about them in the mind, then our project 
of investigating and reconstructing the bodily imagination 
would be undermined. But if imagination can be conceived 
through its bodily causes and through its mental causes (Ep 
17), then there is no reason why we should not investigate 
and reconstruct the bodily causes of imagination. 
Another problem that the idealist objection gives rise 
to is the conceptual or explanatory barrier between thought 
and extension12. As Spinoza states in E2p7sch13, the modes of 
each attribute should be explained by the attribute that the 
mode belongs to and not by any other. This extreme explana-
tory independence happens because Spinoza treats causal and 
conceptual relations as coextensive. And since the conceptu-
al claims are equivalent to the explanatory ones, then causal 
claims count as explanatory claims. So, given that the attri-
butes are causally independent from one another, they must 
be independently explained as well. But then, if explanations 
are the result of an a ivity that the mind does because it is a 
thinking thing, then what is it that we do when explaining ex-
tension? Since the mind (a mode of the attribute of thought) 
cannot explain objects in extension, no mental event can ex-
plain any physical event and vice versa. 
Although causal a ion across attributes is strictly not 
allowed, this causal independence does not imply a causal 
or metaphysical barrier between the attributes. The explan-
atory barrier would only be a real problem if there were a 
dualism of substances, but it is not a problem in the context 
of a theory of infinite attributes. When Spinoza claims in 
E2p6dem that each attribute is conceived through itself and 
that their causal regimes should be kept independent from 
one another, this claim is being made from within a back-
ground in which the substance (or god) is the actor or the 
actual cause of these causal regimes. So, the extreme explan-
atory independence then faces a challenge. For the thesis to 
work, there should be absolutely nothing in common be-
tween the attributes and we should consider the attributes 
as if they were separate substances. If thought is indepen-
dent and dissociated from extension, then there would be a 
metaphysical gap preventing the mind from grasping exter-
nal objects. However, thought and extension are attributes 
or ways of considering the same event; so, while the mind 
is grasping the idea of the object, the body is experiencing 
the object in extension. It is through an individual’s bodily 
experience of other bodies that the existence of the external 
body is acknowledged. The mind of the individual is able to 
form an idea of the external body because it is intera ing 
with the mode of thought of that external body. 
An external body, like any individual body, is a mode of 
substance consisting in a singular object that expresses itself 
through two attributes simultaneously. Hence, if we accept 
the metaphysics of attributes as a ects of the same event of 
a mode of substance, then the idealist objection does not fol-
low. The attributes are actually identical to one another and 
they share the same cause: “The modes of each attribute have 
god for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the 
attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is 
considered under any other attribute” (E2p6). Spinoza here 
is stating that god is the cause of both attributes, but each 
thing should be considered and explained under the very at-
tribute that it belongs to. Here we should remember the goal 
of these demonstrations. Spinoza is arguing against the Car-
tesian conception according to which the body can cause the 
mind to think. The goal here is to reject the causal intera ion 
between attributes, and not to deny their common causal 
origin. So, the extreme causal independence does not imply 
the impossibility of accessing extension, but it necessitates an 
explanation that is  ecific to this causal regime. 
The causal independence does not imply the impossi-
bility of accessing or knowing extension, because there is an 
identity between the attributes since they are ways of consid-
ering the same thing. According to E2p7sch: 
We must recall here what we showed [NS: in 
the First Part], namely, that whatever can be 
perceived by an infinite intellect as consti-
tuting an essence of substance pertains to 
one substance only, and consequently that 
the thinking substance and the extended 
substance are one and the same substance, 
which is now comprehended under this at-
tribute, now under that. So also a mode of 
extension and the idea of that mode are 
one and the same thing, but expressed in 
two ways.
It is true that there is a radical causal independence of 
attributes, but there is also a radical underlying identity (and 
unity) between them that should not be ignored. So, since 
they are attributes of the same substance, there is no barrier 
11 Definition of attributes and the axiom on perception of one’s own body.
12 This problem was raised by Della Rocca (1996), who interprets that the causal independence of attributes gives rise to a radical con-
ceptual or explanatory barrier between thought and extension, a gulf between the attributes (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 9-17). This gulf is 
such that no physical fact can be explained by any mental fact and vice versa.
13 “So long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, 
through the attribute of thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must 
be explained through the attribute of extension alone”.
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or gulf between thought and extension because they are in-
trinsically tied to that of which they are essences. So, although 
there is an explanatory independence of the attributes, it is 
not true to claim that they have nothing in common and, 
therefore, extension is not accessible. It is because they have 
something in common, i.e. god as a common cause, that we 
can understand the same event either through thought or 
through extension. It is because there is no gulf or gap that an 
event can be assimilated both by our thought and our physical 
experiences at the same time. This assimilation, however, if it 
is to be explained, should be considered under each attribute 
separately. That is, the extended a ect of an event should be 
explained according to the extended causes and the mental 
a ect should be explained according to the order of thought. 
This conclusion gives us good reasons to investigate the 
extended causes of imagination because it poses the necessity 
of a separate explanation that captures the order of corporeal 
events. For if Spinoza (in Ep17) conceives of an imagination 
that can have its causes explained by the body, this means 
that there is a physical event of imagination that is conceptu-
ally independent from the mental event of imagination even 
though they are metaphysically identical. In this paper, I tried 
to rule out the idealist position by showing that it is based on a 
false reduction of experience to the attribute of thought, and 
that the explanatory barrier is grounded on an interpretation 
of the attributes as if they were substances. Since the attri-
butes are not substances, the explanatory barrier is merely ap-
parent and does not follow from the substantial monism and 
its relation with the attributes. With my objections, I showed 
that it is not only possible to conceive of the causes of events 
in extension, but that an investigation on the bodily a ects of 
imagination is necessary. So, recapitulating from Ep17: bodily 
imagination is the a ivity that happens due to the constitu-
tion of the body, generating certain effects. The bodily imag-
ination, since it is caused by extension, should be explained 
in separation from the mental imagination which finds its 
causes in thought. The imagination of the body consists of 
the effects, in that body, of modifications that can be caused 
either by itself or by another body. This reconstruction of the 
bodily causes of imagination still must be further explained, 
for what are these modifications and how do they happen? 
In this paper, I tried to demonstrate that Spinoza argues for 
the existence of a bodily imagination that has its own causal 
regime and I end with the suggestion that this a ect of imag-
ination should be further studied. 
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